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BUILDING A NETWORK FOR SUCCESSFUL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN:

Social Network Analysis of the Afghan Peace Process

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About the Peace Accords Matrix

The Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) is a research initiative of the University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. PAM contributes to implementation verification, monitoring, and research by providing a unique source of comparable data on peace agreements, and, through its website, allows scholars and practitioners to compare 51 different themes in all the comprehensive peace agreements signed since 1989. The project also produces numerous policy briefs and academic publications to advance peace agreement negotiation and implementation.



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The dynamic network visualization used in this report can be accessed in the GitHub repository at <https://github.com/sophiahenn/afghan-sna>.

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1. About the Report

The ongoing Afghan peace process, which officially started with the signing of the Doha Agreement between the United States and the Taliban in February 2020, involves a complex network of actors. This project, supported by a faculty research grant from the University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and Keough School of Global Affairs, leverages social network analysis (SNA) to draw insights from original data on bilateral and multilateral meetings of central actors involved in the negotiations. This report explores influential actors, the relationships among these actors, their stakes in the peace process, the evolving nature of such engagements, and the long-term implications of network activity on the prospects for a successful peace process. The report concludes with several recommendations that can be helpful to the negotiating team, practitioners, and policymakers and are meant to support an inclusive and successful peace process.

Add in parentheses and in bold at the end of the paragraph:

(Note: The report analyzes the Afghan peace process data between February 2020 and May 2021 and was completed in July before the Taliban's overthrow.)

2. Executive Summary

- 1.** The ongoing Afghan peace negotiations are highly complex, due in large part to the involvement of many domestic, regional, and international actors, each with different stakes in the conflict and diverse incentives to participate in the peace process.
- 2.** While the Afghan government and the Taliban continue to engage in formal negotiations, both sides have different positions on issues in the peace process. As of the writing of this report in July 2021, the negotiating teams have not been able to introduce substantive issues in formal negotiations.
- 3.** Over time, more actors have become involved in negotiations and more meetings have been held, but the majority of these gatherings are bilateral meetings with the Afghan state, the Taliban, or between third parties.
- 4.** The data shows that the Afghan government, the Taliban, the United States, and NATO are all central actors in the ongoing negotiations, but domestic civil society actors, European countries, and regional countries also hold considerable influence over central actors and issues in the process.
- 5.** This report finds both the Afghan government and the Taliban lacking common agendas needed to enable substantive negotiations. The actors involved in the formal negotiations mostly discuss issues related to the reduction of violence, ceasefire, and security. Women's issues, human rights, and the Afghan economy were most frequently discussed by civil society actors in bilateral meetings with the Afghan government or its negotiation team. Of 87 meetings that included Taliban representatives, only one mentions women's issues in the agenda.

6. In general, the Afghan peace process has failed to build trust through developing relationships beyond formal meetings since the signing of the Doha Agreement. The Taliban are not engaged with civil society actors and the issues they put forth as critical for a political settlement. The report also identifies a need for third party actors to include civil society actors in discussions with the formal negotiating parties, particularly the Taliban, in order to expand the ownership and legitimacy of the negotiation process.

3. Introduction: An Overview of the Afghan Peace Process

The intra-Afghan negotiations are part of the most complex peace process in modern times. After over 40 years of ongoing conflict, the negotiations have been a new source of hope in the search for peace in Afghanistan. They also hold the potential to institutionalize the improvements made with respect to women's rights over the last 20 years. As this report seeks to explain, the Afghan peace process is highly complex due in large part to the involvement of various domestic, regional, and international actors with different stakes in the conflict and diverse incentives for participating in the peace process. This expansive network of stakeholders presents unique challenges and opportunities to build mutual trust, bridge differences, and arrive at solutions that promote long-lasting peace in Afghanistan and stability in the region.

The Afghan government and the Taliban have engaged in formal direct negotiations for over ten months now. The Afghan peace process, however, is more than ten years in the making. In 2010, when United States political and military leaders realized that the Taliban could be weakened but not militarily defeated, the US position started to shift toward finding a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan.¹ A prelude to this shift in US policy began with a meeting between US officials and Taliban representative Mullah Omar in Munich, Germany in November 2010.² By May 2011, roughly a half dozen meetings were said to have occurred between US and

1 Eikenberry, Karl W. 2013. "The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan: The Other Side of the COIN." *Foreign Affairs* 92(5):59–74; Hadley, Stephen and John D. Podesta. 2012. "The Right Way out of Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs* 91(4):41–53.

2 Sheikh, Mona Kanwal, and Maja Touzari Janesdatter Greenwood. 2013. Taliban talks: Past present and prospects for the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan. No. 2013: 06. DIIS Report. <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/97044/1/774665149.pdf>.

Taliban representatives in Doha and Germany.³ The culmination of these initiatives was a set of talks in Doha, which collapsed in January 2012. The US Congress and the Afghan government opposed the talks when the Taliban did not assure all parties that Taliban prisoners released from Guantanamo Bay would not return to fighting. The Taliban formally suspended the talks in March 2012, followed by the Afghan government pulling out in June 2013, citing the Taliban's opening of an embassy-style office in Doha.

After a year and a half, the Afghan government announced that it would hold peace talks with the Taliban in February 2015.⁴ This led to the first round of negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban in Pakistan. These negotiations were also attended by US and Chinese observers. However, this momentum stalled after the death of Taliban leader Mullah Omar.⁵ Mullah Baradar, who served as second-in-command under Mullah Omar, was on house arrest in Pakistan and the parties never met for a second round of talks.⁶

In January 2017, the Taliban offered peace talks with the US when newly-elected president Donald Trump assumed office. While it took several months for the US to demonstrate interest in holding talks with moderate factions within the Taliban, the US position eventually shifted significantly.⁷ By June 2017, the US was pursuing direct talks. As a prelude to the continuous dialogue between the US and Taliban that would unfold over several months, Zalmay

3 Ryan, Missy, Warren Strobel, and Mark Hosenball. 2011. "Exclusive: Secret US, Taliban talks reach turning point." *Reuter*. December 18. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan/exclusive-secret-u-s-taliban-talks-reach-turning-point-idUSTRE7BI03I20111219>.

4 Khan, Imran. 2015. "The Taliban and the government: talking about talking." *Al Jazeera*. February 27. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2015/2/27/the-taliban-and-the-government-talking-about-talking>.

5 *Al Jazeera*. 2015. "Taliban and Afghan government hold talks in Pakistan." July 8. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/7/8/taliban-and-afghan-government-hold-talks-in-pakistan>.

6 Ahmad, Jibrán. 2015. "Afghan Taliban name a new leader, but peace talks delayed." *Reuters*. July 30. <https://www.reuters.com/article/afghanistan-taliban/afghan-taliban-name-a-new-leader-but-peace-talks-delayed-idUKKCNOQ312W20150730>; Hänni, Adrian. 2018. "Why Does Pakistan's Release of a Key Taliban Leader Matter?" *The Diplomat*, October 30. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/why-does-pakistans-release-of-a-key-taliban-leader-matter/>

7 Gramer, Robbie. 2017. "Tillerson Open to Peace Talks with 'Moderate' Taliban." *Foreign Policy*. October 23. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/23/tillerson-open-to-peace-talks-with-taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-south-asia-diplomacy/>

Khalilzad was appointed as President Trump's special envoy to Afghanistan in September 2018 with the primary responsibility of moving the Taliban and Afghan government toward reconciliation.⁸

Between September 2018 and September 2019, the US held at least eight rounds of talks with the Taliban. However, the US suspended further talks after Taliban fighters killed a US soldier in September 2019.⁹ Direct talks between the US and Taliban resumed by December 2019.¹⁰ On February 21, 2020, the US coalition forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban, and the Afghan government agreed to a week-long reduction in violence as a prelude to the framework agreement signed between the US and Taliban on February 29 in Doha, Qatar.¹¹

I. The Doha Agreement

The three-part framework agreement reached in Doha in February 2020 provides (1) a roadmap for the withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan after almost two decades of relentless fighting, (2) a guarantee from the Taliban that it would not allow its members, other individuals, or groups to use Afghan soil to threaten the US or its allies, and (3) the exchange of Afghan government and Taliban prisoners to pave way for intra-Afghan negotiations, among other stipulations.

8 Kelemen, Michele, Diaa Hadid and Vanessa Romo. 2018. "Zalmay Khalilzad Appointed As US Special Adviser To Afghanistan." National Public Radio. September 5. <https://www.npr.org/2018/09/05/641094135/zalmay-khalilzad-appointed-as-u-s-special-adviser-to-afghanistan>.

9 Fritze, John, Deirdre Shesgreen and David Jackson. 2019. "Trump suspends Afghanistan peace talks after attack, cancels secret Camp David meeting" USA Today. September 7. <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/09/07/donald-trump-suspends-afghan-peace-talks-camp-david-taliban/2224106001/>.

10 Deutsche Welle (DW). 2019. "US resumes Taliban talks in Doha." December 7. <https://www.dw.com/en/us-resumes-taliban-talks-in-doha/a-51567644>

11 Neuman, Scott and Diaa Hadid. 2020. "US, Afghanistan And Taliban Announce 7-Day 'Reduction In Violence'" National Public Radio. February 21. <https://www.npr.org/2020/02/21/808029567/u-s-afghanistan-and-taliban-announce-7-day-reduction-in-violence>.

The agreement has a number of complexities from a comparative peace process perspective.¹² First, the Doha Agreement was formed between a non-state actor and a third-party state. Through the agreement, the US recognizes the legitimacy of the Taliban in Afghanistan, but the Afghan state is not a signatory of the agreement. The United States signed a separate declaration with the Afghan government. Second, the signatories of the agreement expect compliance from multiple actors, including the Afghan state and the United Nations Security Council. The Afghan state was expected to exchange prisoners with the Taliban, and the United Nations Security Council was expected to approve the agreement and lift sanctions on the Taliban.

Finally, the agreement's implementation was the basis for intra-Afghan negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government to reach a comprehensive political settlement. There is no definite deadline for the completion of this process, whereas the withdrawal of US and NATO troops had a completion deadline of May 1, 2021.

Given these complexities, implementation of the Doha Agreement did not start immediately. The United States and its NATO allies organized separate high-level meetings with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and other high-ranking officials in the weeks following the signing of the agreement in order to assure political ownership of the process.¹³ While the Afghan state and the Taliban did not cease fighting, implementation of the Doha Agreement started slowly in March 2020 with the Afghan government's appointment of a 21-member negotiating team that included four female

12 Joshi, Madhav. 2021. "Assessing Implementation of the 2020 US-Taliban Peace Accord." Notre Dame, IN: Keough School of Global Affairs. <https://doi.org/10.7274/r0-k8n7-2a40>.

13 Our publicly available data suggests that the NATO leaders and the US envoy and senior officials were in constant contact with the Afghan government during the negotiation process.

representatives.¹⁴ The prisoner exchange began in April 2020 and was completed in August 2020 after the Loya Jirga approved the release of 400 high-risk Taliban members from government prisons.¹⁵

The Doha Agreement stipulates the release of the prisoners as a sequential process leading to the initiation of direct talks in Doha. As soon as the prisoner exchange was completed, the Taliban announced their 21-member all-male negotiating team.¹⁶ With the selection of negotiation teams representing the Taliban and the Afghan government, the intra-Afghan negotiations commenced in Doha on September 12, 2020. The first phase of the negotiations consisted of 12 direct talks and concluded with the parties reaching a 21-point agreement on Rules and Procedures on December 8, 2020.¹⁷

After this procedural agreement, the negotiation parties struggled to initiate a second round of talks. While the Afghan government's negotiation team returned to Doha in January 2021, negotiations did not start for weeks.¹⁸ One of the contributing factors was the lack of a joint agenda with substantive issues agreed upon by both parties. Both sides have different positions on facets of the ongoing conflict

14 International Crisis Group. 2020. "Keeping Intra-Afghan Talks on Track." September 30. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/keeping-intra-afghan-talks-track>.

The four women at the negotiation table are Habiba Sarabi (the first female governor of Bamyan province in 2005 and the deputy head of the Afghan government's High Peace Council, a body established in 2010 to negotiate with the Taliban), Fatima Gailani (the president of the Afghan Red Crescent Society), Sharifa Zurmati Wardak (an elected member of Afghanistan's lower house of parliament in 2005 and a member of the Independent Election Commission in 2014), and Fawzia Koofi (an elected member of Afghanistan's lower house of parliament in 2005, a deputy speaker of parliament in 2006, and a founder of the Movement for Change political party).

15 Gul, Ayaz. 2020. "Afghan Loya Jirga Meets to Determine Fate of 400 Taliban Prisoners Ahead of Peace Talks." Voice of America. August 7. <https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/afghan-loya-jirga-meets-determine-fate-400-taliban-prisoners-ahead-peace-talks>.

16 George, Susannah and Aziz Tassal and Haq Nawaz Khan. 2020. "Shadow politicians, clerics and Soviet-era fighters: The Taliban's team negotiating peace." The Washington Post. September 30. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghan-taliban-peace-talks/2020/09/30/a5333540-f859-11ea-85f7-5941188a98cd_story.html.

17 Afghan Analysts Network. 2021. "The Rules of Procedure for Intra-Afghan Talks" January 2. <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/resources/peace-process/aans-working-translation-of-the-rules-of-procedures/>

18 Javaid, Osama Bin. 2021. "Why Afghanistan-Taliban peace talks have not reached breakthrough." Al Jazeera. January 12. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/12/why-have-the-afghanistan-taliban-peace-talks-stalled>

and divergent visions for the future political system, particularly with regard to women's rights and inclusion. A second contributing factor was the announcement that the new US administration under President Joseph Biden was reviewing the Doha Agreement. And a third factor was related to the overall viability of the Doha process. While the Doha Agreement achieved an average level of overall accord implementation at best, as discussed in a previous report published by the University of Notre Dame's Keough School of Global Affairs, accord provisions that the Taliban were responsible for implementing did not progress as expected.¹⁹

II. Current State of the Peace Process

The Doha process did not build enough momentum and trust to lay the groundwork for substantive intra-Afghan negotiations. Therefore, in March 2021, the US proposed a draft agreement that would effectively sideline the Doha process.²⁰ In the leaked draft agreement, the US outlined a transitional government, a ceasefire with an international monitoring mechanism, negotiations on constitutional changes, and an international conference on Afghanistan. In a letter to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, the US Secretary of State suggested that the US invite the governments of Turkey and Qatar and the UN to jointly host senior-level meetings with the Afghan state, the Taliban, and regional actors in order to finalize a peace agreement.

The reaction from stakeholders in the peace process to the draft agreement was relatively swift but incongruent. Abdullah Abdullah, head of Afghanistan's High Council for National Reconciliation, noted the "unique opportunity" presented by the proposed international conference in Turkey, but Ghani rejected the US

19 Joshi, Madhav. 2021. "Assessing Implementation of the 2020 US-Taliban Peace Accord." Notre Dame, IN: Keough School of Global Affairs. <https://doi.org/10.7274/r0-k8n7-2a40>.

20 Tolo News. 2021. Exclusive: Details of Proposed Draft for Afghan Peace." March 7. <https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-170504>

proposal and offered his own three-phase plan.²¹ Ghani's plan includes reaching the desired end state with the internationally-verified comprehensive ceasefire in place, the establishment of elections and a transitional "government of peace," and negotiations on constitutional issues including the reintegration of refugees and reconstruction. While Ghani's plan introduces a role for the UN as a neutral mediator, the proposal has failed to gain any traction so far from domestic and international stakeholders. The Taliban rejected the proposal from Ghani, as well as the extension of the US troop withdrawal deadline to September 11, 2021.²² As of this writing, the proposed international conference has yet to be held in Turkey. After a brief three-day ceasefire during the Eid holidays, Afghan negotiators returned to Doha in mid-May and met with the Taliban.²³ The Taliban have hinted at the proposal of their own peace plan to the Afghan government.²⁴

On July 8, Iran hosted a two-day meeting between the Taliban delegation and a group of Afghan politicians in which they agreed that "war is not the solution" and "a peaceful solution should be sought."²⁵ Although the development of understandings like these may reinvigorate hope in the peace process and all parties have agreed to resume negotiations, there were no substantial signs of commitment to the process or demonstrated efforts to make progress toward a political settlement.

The lack of progress in the formal negotiations poses questions about the viability of Afghanistan's ongoing peace process. Will the

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- 21 Amiry, Sharif. 2021. "Abdullah: Turkey Conference 'Unique Opportunity' for Peace." Tolo News. March 28. <https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-171045>; Al Jazeera. 2021. "Afghan president proposes three-phase peace roadmap: Report." April 5. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/5/afghan-leader-proposes-peace-roadmap-in-three-phases-document>.
- 22 Aninews. 2021. "Afghanistan: Taliban rejects US peace plan, six-month extension on troops withdrawal deadline." April 13. <https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-rejects-us-peace-plan-six-month-extension-on-troops-withdrawal-deadline20210413201653/>.
- 23 Reuters. 2021. "Taliban and Afghan government negotiators meet in Doha." May 14. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-afghan-government-negotiators-meet-doha-2021-05-14/>.
- 24 Reuters. 2021. "EXCLUSIVE: Taliban aim to present written peace plan at talks as soon as next month." July 6. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-taliban-aim-present-written-peace-plan-talks-soon-next-month-spokesman-2021-07-05/>.
- 25 Tolo News. 2021. "Taliban, Afghan Delegates in Iran Agree 'War Is Not Solution'." July 8. <https://tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan-173376>.

central actors succeed in negotiating a peace agreement in the coming months or even a year from now? What are the prospects for the process to secure peace and an acceptable political settlement in Afghanistan?

The ongoing negotiations in Doha, the proposed peace deals from the US, and the Afghan President's counter-proposal indicate inconsistencies among central actors on three fronts that must be harmonized to ensure a successful peace process. First, a relational network including all peace process stakeholders is crucial for a successful negotiation process. In Afghanistan, the government, representing various political parties, is internally divided into multiple factions or divisions, which is evident in the ways senior political leaders react and position themselves on peace process issues. On the contrary, the Taliban appears as a cohesive group. Senior Afghan political leaders do not have easy access to Taliban leaders. While the negotiating teams representing both sides engage in formal talks, senior political leaders from both sides do not, limiting the viability of the process.

Second, successful negotiations can transpire only when negotiating parties converge on issues related to the peace process. The ongoing intra-Afghan process reevaluates divisions within the political leadership in the Afghan government. While President Ghani offered a three-phase peace plan, his proposal did not represent the position of all political sides in the Afghan government. Because the Taliban rejected Ghani's proposal, it also indicates that the US, the Afghan government, and the Taliban have yet to align on peace process issues. Afghan peace process stakeholders desire to take ownership of their own peace process, which is less likely to materialize when key actors hold divergent positions on critical issues.

Third, civil society actors represent diverse actors and issues pertinent in the negotiation process, and are key to ensuring that the peace process is inclusive. They play an instrumental role in bridging both sides and bringing attention to local issues in negotiations. In Afghanistan, civil society groups in general have limited access to the peace process given the location

of negotiation activities in Doha. While higher-profile women's organizations have some access to the Afghan government and the Afghan negotiating team, they have no access to the Taliban. Not all international actors have access to the Afghan government and the Taliban and those who have are yet to cultivate a space for wider groups of civil society actors to engage.

The following section presents the data and methodological approach of social network analysis (SNA) used to explore various stakeholders involved in the Afghan peace negotiations. It shows the usefulness of this approach to further explore the three issues outlined above. In particular, this approach examines the actors involved in the Afghan peace process, their relationships to each other, the issues for which they advocate, and the missing links that need to be addressed in order to facilitate a successful and inclusive peace process.

4. Data and Methodology

This report utilizes publicly available information on bilateral and multilateral meetings between a range of domestic, regional, and international actors on issues relevant to the Afghan peace process. We used two criteria to define the scope of data. First, actors involved in bilateral or multilateral meetings are relevant to the intra-Afghan negotiations. We identified an initial set of central actors, including both negotiation teams, US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, Afghan government officials, NATO and UN missions, and more.²⁶ The second criterion specifies that the meeting agenda must relate to the ongoing intra-Afghan negotiations.

With these two criteria, data was collected from the Twitter accounts of pertinent actors, press releases from their respective offices, and news websites such as Al Jazeera and the Associated Press. Details of the meetings for each actor were reviewed, and any actors they met with were reviewed in the same manner. This resulted in the creation of a network whereby the scope of actors is limited to two degrees of separation from the central actors. In order to isolate the network engaged with the Afghan peace process, meetings between third parties (such as meetings of UN or NATO officials and member states) are not counted unless the agenda explicitly mentions the Afghan peace process.

Information was collected on each meeting, including the date, actors present, agenda, and location when available. Meetings with more than two actors present were split into dyads, and unique meeting IDs were created to trace dyads from the same meeting. Within the Afghan government, various government entities and individual political figures have been involved in bilateral and multilateral meetings. These entities and individuals include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; State Ministry for Peace; political leaders in power such as Ashraf Ghani, Abdullah Abdullah, and Hamdullah Mohib; and subnational government, former, and

²⁶ Appendix A identifies all relevant actors that were identified as central in the intra-Afghan negotiation process and provides detailed data with available information.

other Afghan government officials. Since February 2020, two appointed government delegations—the Peace Initial Contact Group and the formal Afghan Government Negotiation Team—have engaged in direct negotiations with the Taliban. The Peace Initial Contact Group represented the Afghan government to coordinate prisoner release with the Taliban before the formation of the Afghan Government Negotiation Team. Highlighting the engagements between these individuals and Afghan state entities allows us to explore the significance of actors and the divisions or fragmentations within the government regarding the peace process. As explored further in the following section, the individuals and entities within the Afghan state will be aggregated into one Afghan government actor for a portion of the network analysis, but the Afghan Government Negotiation Team is distinguished from this aggregated actor in order to keep Afghan state engagements separate from the formal negotiations in Doha.

I. An Overview of Data

This report analyzes a total of 612 meetings recorded between February 1, 2020, through May 31, 2021. Meetings involving more than two actors were split into dyads, resulting in 786 meeting dyads in the data. The disaggregated dataset distinguishes between the ten aforementioned individuals and Afghan state entities and includes 85 distinct actors, while the aggregated dataset consolidates the government actors and contains 77 distinct actors.²⁷

To understand the evolving relationships among actors, we split the data into four distinct periods marked by major developments in the negotiations and mapped the actors involved in the relational network.

Period 1: February 29, 2020 - September 11, 2020, Doha Agreement to the initiation of the formal intra-Afghan talks (45 distinct actors, 131 meetings)

²⁷ For list of actors, see Appendix A.

Period 2: September 12, 2020 - December 8, 2020, Initiation of the formal intra-Afghan talks to the Agreement on Rules & Procedures (45 distinct actors, 129 meetings)

Period 3: December 9, 2020 - April 13, 2021, Agreement on Rules & Procedures to the Biden Administration’s review of the Doha Agreement and announcement of new troop withdrawal date (61 distinct actors, 257 meetings)

Period 4: April 14, 2021 - May 31, 2021, Biden Administration review of the Agreement to end of May 2021 (43 distinct actors, 95 meetings)

The figures below illustrate how the frequency of meetings and number of actors involved changes over time.




Figure 1 provides an overview of all actors involved in meetings since February 2020. Since February 2020, the engagement of third parties in the peace process outside of the formal negotiations in Doha has increased significantly. The rate of meetings per month has also increased significantly, particularly since January 2021.




Figure 2a provides an overview of the frequency of meetings for each type of dyad from February 2020 through May 2021. Those who are not Afghan government or Taliban representatives are treated as third parties in Figure 2a and include all civil society actors, Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other countries. The figure demonstrates that although total negotiation activity was increasing over time, most of this activity is between the Afghan government and third parties such as IGOs and country representatives. Direct meetings between the Afghan government and the Taliban saw the smallest increase in frequency; for the entire time period under observation, they met only 23 times. This is followed by the frequency of meetings between the Taliban negotiating team and third parties (a total of 67 meetings). As Figure 2a demonstrates, the Afghan government is the most

engaged with representatives of IGOs and foreign countries, followed by domestic and international civil society organizations.




Figure 2b provides an overview of the proportions of meetings involving each dyad type. Seventy-five percent of all 112 meeting dyads with the Taliban involve IGOs and foreign countries. Taliban engagement with the Afghan government and its negotiation team and with civil society actors made up only 21% and 4% of dyads respectively.

Civil society actors were involved in 104 meetings. The majority of these meetings were with other IGOs or country representatives (48% of dyads) and/or the Afghan government and its negotiation team (44%), followed by a small portion of meeting dyads with the Taliban (4%) and other civil society actors (4%).

At least one third-party IGO or other country representative was present in 543 (89%) of all meetings. Sixty percent of the meeting dyads for IGOs or country representatives were with the Afghan government or its negotiation team, 19% with other IGOs or country representatives, 12% with the Taliban, and 9% with civil society actors.

Figure 2b reveals that the Afghan government and Taliban are primarily engaged with international actors, while civil society actors are the least likely to engage with the Taliban. Most of the activity between IGOs or other countries occurs with the Afghan government.

Most of the meetings recorded and analyzed in this report involving the Taliban took place in Doha, but Taliban representatives also traveled to several countries in the region—Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and Tajikistan—for meetings on the peace process. Although many of the meetings were conducted virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic, high-level negotiations among all actors occurred in at least 14 different countries including Afghanistan. Most of the meetings involving civil society actors with Afghan state representatives and representatives from IGOs and other countries took place in Afghanistan or virtually.

II. Notes on Data Limitations

The data collected and analyzed in this report is publicly available and uniquely captures the relationships of various actors in the intra-Afghan peace process. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the potential limitations of the data. The data generated through the method that we outlined in this section has two main limitations.

1. The method of collecting data assumes that Twitter activity is an accurate reflection of meeting activity. It is possible that not all actors are equally active on social media or transparent about their activity. To address this limitation, data collection on Twitter is supplemented by a review of appropriate embassy and agency websites.
2. By limiting the scope of actors to two degrees of separation from central actors, other actors and their connections to existing actors in the network are omitted. This was necessary to define the scope of the research, which was to understand the network of actors directly involved in the Afghan peace process.

III. The Social Network Analysis Method

Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a method to study, describe, and gain insight from social phenomena involving complex relationships.²⁸ This project leverages SNA to explore the dynamics of the ongoing Afghan peace process under the assumption that peace negotiations are social phenomena involving armed and unarmed actors. Over time, the relationships among these actors evolve, which shape the prospects of a negotiated settlement and its durability over time. SNA is applied to identify influential actors, the relationships among these actors and their stakes in the peace process, the evolving nature of such engagements over time, and the long-term implications of network activity on the prospects for a successful peace process. The following section presents the findings from the network analysis of Afghan peace process data.

28 Shafie, Termeh. 2020. *Social Network Analysis*. SAGE; Borgatti, Stephen P., Ajay Mehra, Daniel J. Brass, and Giuseppe Labianca. 2009. "Network analysis in the social sciences." *Science* 323(5916): 892-895.

5. Social Network Analysis Results

The findings demonstrate that the ongoing negotiations are dynamic and uncertain, but their future is still hopeful should the parties mobilize key actors throughout the relational network. Several structural measurements will be explored below in order to address the following questions about the negotiations.

- **Relationships:** Who has the strongest relationships in the network? What communities or clusters are present? How do these clusters of actors relate to one another?
- **Influences:** Who are the most influential actors in the network? Who are the most connected to others? How dense is the network?
- **Issues:** What issues are being discussed in the negotiations, and by whom? How are the issues being discussed changing over time?

I. Relationships

Relationships between actors can be described by the frequency or consistency with which they meet, and groups of relationships can be analyzed to identify communities or clusters within the network. In the ongoing negotiations, the actors who have meet most frequently are (1) Abdullah Abdullah and the US, (2) other Afghan government officials and NATO, (3) Abdullah Abdullah and NATO, (4) the Taliban Negotiation Team and the US, (5) the Taliban Negotiation Team and the Afghan Government Negotiation Team, and (6) Ashraf Ghani and the US. In order to understand the evolving relationships among actors, we mapped the evolution of the network from Period 1 through Period 4 (as previously defined in the Overview of the Data section). We demonstrate this network comparison below with periods 1 and 3; all four network comparisons are located in Appendix B.


Figure 03

Network Comparison of Period 1 and Period 3 with Disaggregated Government Actors

(Actors in the upper 50th percentile of meeting activity are labeled.)



Period 1



Period 3




Figure 3 demonstrates the evolving relationships between actors over time²⁹ and the introduction of new actors to the peace process. Abdullah Abdullah and NATO have the most consistent relationship, meeting 22 times overall (23% of meetings in period 1, 23% in period 2, 41% in period 3, 13% in period 4), while the majority of meetings for other relationships took place during one period. This includes direct meetings between the Taliban and the US where 52% of meetings were held during period 1, when the delegations were negotiating the Doha Agreement and coordinating the troop withdrawal.


Relationships among actors in the negotiations can also be examined through their group dynamics. There are several large subgroups within the negotiations where all actors have mutual connections to each other. The largest and most active subgroup contains the Afghan government, the Taliban Negotiation Team, US, EU, UK, France, Italy, Germany, NATO, and Norway.³⁰ Another active clique contains the Afghan Government Negotiation Team, the Taliban Negotiation Team, UN, US, Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia.

Clustering algorithms can be applied to detect patterns and identify communities of relationships within the larger network. Four different algorithms were applied for robustness and the communities of actors were compared.³¹ Figure 4 identifies these communities within the larger network of actors involved in the peace process by using a fast greedy community detection algorithm.

Figure
04

Clustered Network of Afghan Peace Process Actors

(Actor pairs with three or more engagements are shown below.)



Several communities of third party country representatives are also identified that are characterized by high meeting frequency and strong triadic closure, meaning that close to all possible meeting combinations in a given community have occurred. These communities are (1) European actors including Germany, Norway, France, and Italy, and (2) regional actors including Pakistan, China, Iran, and Russia. These country representatives met more frequently with actors in their own community and were generally participants of the same multilateral conferences or meetings on issues related to the Afghan peace process. Their incentives for participating in the peace process, as well as the implications of their engagement, are discussed in the Recommendations section.

II. Influence

The preceding section highlights the relationships among actors involved in the Afghan negotiation process. It shows how frequently peace process actors in Afghanistan are engaged with each other. However, actors are strategically positioned to influence the network in different ways. This section of the report examines how different actors emerge as more influential in the ongoing negotiation process in Afghanistan.

Figures 5a and 5b illustrate how Afghan peace process actors relate to one another at the aggregate and disaggregated levels.³² While the formal negotiations are closed to the 21-member negotiation team from each side without a formal mediator, both negotiation teams meet and communicate regularly with third parties such as the US, UN, and NATO. Domestic and international civil society organizations also participate in a significant portion of meetings.

Figure 05a

Aggregated Network of Afghan Peace Process Actors with Nodes Colored by Actor Type and Sized by Total Number of Dyadic Engagements

(Actors with at least three dyadic engagements are shown.)

- Actor Type
- Afghan Government
 - Civil Society
 - Taliban
 - IGOs/Country Representatives





Figure 05b Disaggregated Network of Afghan Peace Process Actors with Nodes Colored by Actor Type and Sized by Total Number of Dyadic Engagements
 (Actors with at least three dyadic engagements are shown.)



Several network centrality measurements are useful to determine the most influential and well-connected actors in the ongoing negotiation process.³³ Degree centrality measurements reveal that the Afghan government, Afghan Government Negotiation Team, US, NATO, and Taliban Negotiation Team have the most direct connections to other actors in the network.³⁴ The Afghan government is directly connected to 63% of all actors, the US to 39%, and NATO to 38%. These results are expected given that these actors were identified as central to the direct negotiations in Doha and the data collection procedure subsequently focused on them. The data shows that 60% of all actors in the network are directly connected to at least one negotiation team, and 23% have met separately with both negotiation teams or jointly in some instances. This finding is significant because the Afghan state and Taliban may only be formally communicating through their respective negotiation teams, but both sides are engaging with some of the same third parties. These third parties form several clusters that include (1) EU member states and (2) Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia. The significance of these third parties will be discussed in the recommendations section.

Closeness centrality measurements reveal that the same actors with high degree centrality also have the shortest average paths to everyone else in the network.³⁵ However, by this measurement, the US and NATO surpass the Afghan Government Negotiation Team as more central actors. The Afghan Government Negotiation Team, NATO, and the US meet with similar country representatives in the network, but the US and NATO meet with a larger group of international civil society actors.

33 Centrality measurements of degrees, closeness, and betweenness examine different qualities of an actor's relationships to determine who is most central or influential in a network. The network with aggregated government actors is used for all centrality calculations, and these calculations can be found in Appendix E. A correlation matrix comparing the similarity of results between each measurement can also be found in Appendix F2. The coefficients in the correlation matrix for all centrality measurements were between 0.62 and 0.94.

34 Degree centrality is calculated for each actor by counting the number of direct links to other actors in the network.

35 Closeness centrality is calculated for each actor by taking the average of the distance from the actor to all other actors in the network.

Betweenness centrality examines how often an actor lies along the shortest path between two other actors.³⁶ An actor may be overlooked if it serves as a bridge between many actors but is not necessarily central to any single social cluster.³⁷ Comparing the centrality rankings of actors by closeness and betweenness yields interesting results; the largest positive shift in rank occurs in Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden) and domestic civil society groups (Afghan province representatives, Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the largest negative shift in rank occurs in European countries (UK, France, Italy, EU). Thus, while the Nordic countries and domestic civil society groups may seem less involved in the ongoing negotiation process than other actors (ex. US, NATO), their active involvement could help to build the momentum necessary to jumpstart the stalled negotiation process. Further, the involvement of domestic civil society groups promotes broader representation of Afghan society and can thus increase the domestic ownership of the negotiation process.

III. Negotiation Issues

The structure of relationships and the influence of certain actors can dictate the issues discussed both in formal negotiations and in public discourse. Since February 2020, the majority of negotiations have concentrated on issues relating to prisoner release and troop withdrawal, as these issues were explicitly mentioned in the Doha Agreement (see Table 1). Figure 6 summarizes the peace process actors most frequently discussing these key substantive issues.

The public discourse and the priorities set forth by the Afghan government, however, include issues related to the cessation of hostilities and an internationally verifiable ceasefire. The Agreement on Rules and Procedures in December 2020 was considered the first sign of progress in the negotiations as it outlined procedures

³⁶ Betweenness centrality is calculated for each actor by counting how many shortest paths the actor lies on between two other actors in the network.

³⁷ Gatewood, James R., and Candice R. Price. 2017. "Utilizing social network analysis to study communities of women in conflict zones." *Journal of Humanistic Mathematics* 7(1): 3-21. See page 14.

for future talks and was supposed to commence discussion of substantive issues in the joint agenda. However, the negotiation teams did not enter into the next negotiation phase of discussing and finding common ground on substantive issues. Taliban officials demanded the withdrawal of all US troops and the removal of its high-ranking officials from US and UN sanctions lists in order to move forward with negotiations. After the creation of the Agreement on Rules and Procedures in December, the negotiation team met only seven times through late May 2021 and their meetings were largely inconclusive. The Taliban continued to meet with third party countries during this time, strengthening their engagements with regional actors including Pakistan and Russia and European actors including Norway, Germany, and the EU.

To understand the substantive issues in the negotiations, this report examines all publicly available descriptions of agendas that were discussed in formal negotiations and bilateral or multilateral meetings of domestic and international stakeholders. Based on the frequency of keywords appearing in the meeting agendas, other popular issues in the peace process include human rights (58 meetings), women’s issues (56 meetings), and the Afghan economy (45 meetings). Disaggregating these meetings by period shows that discussions on issues related to women’s issues, human rights, and the Afghan economy have generally occurred in the latter two periods.


Table
01

Proportion of Substantive Issues Discussed in each Period

PERIOD	% OF ALL MEETINGS	WOMEN'S ISSUES	HUMAN RIGHTS	ECONOMY	CEASEFIRE	PRISONER RELEASE	TROOP WITHDRAWAL
1	22.3	10.7	10.9	15.6	19.7	90	25
2	20.8	14.3	16.4	20	15.2	5	0
3	41.5	66.1	54.5	33.3	54.5	5	25
4	15.4	8.9	18.2	31.1	10.6	0	50
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

While the Afghan state, the Taliban, the US, and NATO engaged in a larger proportion of meetings on ceasefire, prisoner release, and troop withdrawal, civil society actors have played a large role in raising the visibility of other issues in the negotiations. Though only 17% of meetings included civil society actors, they were present at 44.6% of all meetings that mentioned women’s issues on the agenda. Further, these meetings mostly occurred with the Afghan government, Afghan Government Negotiation Team, or UN. Of 87 meetings that include Taliban representatives, only one meeting mentions women’s issues in the agenda. Discussion of women’s issues and human rights was also common among European country representatives and IGOs including NATO, UN, and EU. And while the four female members of the government’s negotiation team have particularly advocated for the inclusion of women’s issues in the direct negotiations in Doha, delays in the talks have sidelined this agenda to focus on issues of ceasefire and the US troop withdrawal. On the issue of human rights, the role of civil society actors is even stronger: 58.2% of all meetings that discuss human rights include the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and civil society actors.

Figure 06 Type of Meeting Dyads Discussing a Range of Issues in the Peace Process



Supporting the development of the Afghan economy has also been an explicit aim of several third parties, including the US,³⁸ who view economic stabilization and growth as a requisite for durable peace and regional security. The actors most frequently discussing the Afghan economy in the context of the peace process are the Afghan government with regional actors including Qatar, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, along with NATO, the UN and US.

38 United States Institute of Peace (USIP). 2021. "Afghanistan Study Group Final Report: A Pathway for Peace in Afghanistan." February 3, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/02/afghanistan-study-group-final-report-pathway-peace-afghanistan>.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

The network analysis reveals an evolving peace process in terms of actors and issues, despite the stalled direct negotiations in Doha. Based on the empirical analysis of Afghan peace process data and comparative research on peace processes, this report makes the following recommendations to promote the sustainable and inclusive negotiation process necessary to achieve durable peace.

A. By visibly engaging in informal and formal meetings, both Afghan and Taliban leadership can jumpstart the stalled negotiation process.

Both the Afghan and the Taliban leadership need to visibly engage in informal negotiations and meetings in order for the formal peace process to work. While the negotiating teams representing both sides are engaged in the formal negotiation process, key leadership engagement outside of the formal process has been minimal. Afghan and Taliban leaders have not been seen meeting with each other. The negotiation process succeeds when both sides engage with each other both formally and informally in order to overcome mistrust, as can be witnessed through the informal discussions and negotiations that took place in Nepal and South Africa. In both of these countries, leaders sought informal negotiations as way to build the trust necessary to continue the formal negotiation process. The conditions in Afghanistan require both actors to overcome mistrust in order to arrive at a political settlement that works for both parties.

Building trust and relationships are key to reducing the current level of violence. While regional and international actors are seen as influential, support from these actors can only be effective when the Afghan state and the Taliban work together. Therefore, the

Afghan government and the Taliban need to seek ways to build trust proactively and take ownership of the process.

B. By agreeing on substantive negotiation issues, both the Afghan government and the Taliban can engage with broader peace process stakeholders.

One factor contributing to the lack of significant outcomes from the intra-Afghan negotiations is the lack of substantive negotiation agendas. The Afghan president and the US have offered their plans, and as of this writing, the Taliban have indicated a potential roadmap of their own will be forthcoming soon.³⁹ Our analysis of meeting data descriptions involving the Afghan and the Taliban sides shows the issues of troop withdrawal, ceasefire, and ceasefire monitoring continue to be prioritized in direct negotiations. When other substantive issues are mentioned, such as women's issues, human rights, and the Afghan economy, they are most often addressed in meetings between third parties such as civil society organizations, NATO, and the UN, or in meetings between the Afghan government and a third party.

The Afghan government and the Taliban need to find consensus around these substantive issues for the next phase in the peace process to be productive. By agreeing on substantive issues to include in meeting agendas, parties indicate their willingness to discuss those issues and build relationships to find mutually-acceptable solutions. Because the negotiation teams representing both sides are either exclusionary or not representative enough, a negotiation process that includes issues from broader peace process stakeholders offers the opportunity to engage with these actors and make the issues being discussed as part of the peace process more inclusive.

39 "Reuters. 2021. "EXCLUSIVE: Taliban aim to present written peace plan at talks as soon as next month." July 6. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-taliban-aim-present-written-peace-plan-talks-soon-next-month-spokesman-2021-07-05/>.

C. By developing a united political front on negotiation agendas, the Afghan government can engage more robustly in the negotiation process.

One of the key findings from the network analysis of meetings shows the involvement of various officials and agencies representing the Afghan state or political parties in the ongoing negotiation process. It is a sign of fractures among Afghan political leaders, also illustrated by the inconsistent positions put forth in peace plans from both the Afghan president and the US. The acceptance of a political settlement by the Afghan state will depend on a unified political front during the negotiations. Lessons from peace process in Burundi and Nepal can provide useful insights here. All political forces developed unified political positions in Burundi in 2000, leading to successful negotiations with the main rebel group, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). Similarly, all political parties came together in Nepal in 2005, leading to successful negotiations in 2006.

D. By opening up for meetings and discussions with a wide range of civil society actors and stakeholders, the Taliban can improve its domestic dialogue and engagement.

The network analysis of meeting data shows the Taliban has engaged with IGOs, regional countries, and other third party states more frequently than with the Afghan government or Afghan civil society actors. These civil society actors represent a diverse Afghan society that the Taliban hope to govern in the future. Because Taliban leaders have been based outside Afghanistan (mostly in Pakistan) and the negotiation team is based in Doha, the Taliban side may not be attuned to the broader social, political, and economic issues facing the Afghan state in recent times. As such,

it is reasonable for Afghan civilians to be fearful about the intent of the Taliban if a political solution is reached. The Taliban can begin to overcome such shortcomings by engaging with civil society actors and using these relationships to send their messages directly to the broader Afghan society.

E. By leveraging relations with IGOs and third-party countries, Afghan civil society actors can make the ongoing negotiation process more inclusive.

The Afghan Government Negotiation Team includes civil society representatives who speak on issues related to women and youth. The Taliban team does not include any such civil society representatives. The civil society groups in Afghanistan, particularly women's organizations and their movements, play significant roles in providing leadership and a vision for the future of Afghanistan. The analyzed data shows the considerable influence of these actors with IGOs and third party countries. Civil society actors should use their relationships with IGOs and third party countries who have leverage over the main negotiating parties in order to help make the ongoing negotiation process inclusive and establish their credibility as independent monitors of the peace process in the future. This will be instrumental in establishing the necessary infrastructure for peace agreement compliance.

F. By jointly engaging the Afghan and the Taliban sides, regional actors, IGOs, and other countries, including the United States, can provide new momentum for ongoing negotiations.

For substantive negotiations to take place in the coming months, the Afghan government and the Taliban need constructive

disruption, not the continuity of the current approach to the negotiations. In the data, regional countries, IGOs, and the US are the most influential actors in the negotiation process, and several have approached both parties with offers to serve as official mediators during direct talks. While the proposed international conference in Turkey has elements involving all these actors, it is too big a risk at the current time given the lack of trust and agreement on substantive issues. However, these actors can gradually help the Afghan government and the Taliban in two different ways.

First, regional countries can agree on a pact similar to those agreed upon among Central American countries in the late 1980s. Between 1986 and 1990, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica negotiated at least eight different agreements on regional conflict dynamics, leading to successful peace processes in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Neighbouring countries to Afghanistan can adopt a similar approach to address the dynamics playing out in the Afghan conflict. The Istanbul Process already provides a platform for regional countries to engage with issues in Afghanistan that are central to regional security. A regional pact that reinforces neighbouring countries' commitment to the Afghan peace process can be useful to instil much-needed confidence in the process.

Second, regional countries, IGOs, and the US can facilitate more frequent meetings and discussions involving both the Taliban and the Afghan government. So far, these influential actors are engaged with these actors bilaterally. A move from bilateral to multilateral meetings with all conflict actors is likely to disrupt the current negotiation approach by offering new ways to build and improve much-needed mutual trust and relationships. However, this may only be productive once the Taliban and Afghan government have agreed upon a joint agenda to direct negotiations in a productive manner.

Many of these recommendations focus on building trust and mutual relationships and finding common issues to drive a meaningful negotiation process. The Afghan negotiation process is likely to face continuing challenges in the coming months given the conflict dynamics and the withdrawal of US and NATO troops. However, these recommendations will remain relevant as long as both sides remain committed to finding political solutions through the peace process.

7. Appendix

Appendix A

List of Actors Involved in the Afghan Peace Process

ACTOR	MEETING DYADS	ACTOR	MEETING DYADS
Afghan Government		IGOs	
Abdullah Abdullah	115	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	178
Hamdullah Mohib	85	United Nations (UN)	79
Ashraf Ghani	78	European Union (EU)	37
Afghan Government Negotiation Team	73	Heart of Asia Istanbul Process	2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	45	Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)	1
State Ministry for Peace	41	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	1
Other Afghan government officials	31		
Peace Initial Contact Group (PICG)	11	Country Representatives	
Subnational Afghan government officials	10	United States (US)	160
Former Afghan government officials	8	Qatar	37
		Pakistan	35
		Germany	33
		United Kingdom (UK)	29
		China	28
		Norway	27
		India	21
		Iran	21
		France	18
		Turkey	17
		Russia	16
		Italy	15
		Denmark	10
		Japan	8
		Tajikistan	8
Taliban			
Taliban Negotiation Team	112		
Civil Society			
AIHRC	31		
National Youth Consensus for Peace	14		
Afghan province representatives	13		
Afghan women civil society leaders	8		
Afghan youth	7		
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	6		
Afghan journalists	6		
Aga Khan Development Network	5		
American University of Afghanistan	4		

ACTOR	MEETING DYADS	ACTOR	MEETING DYADS
Afghan civil society representatives	3	Indonesia	7
Friends of Afghan Women	3	Uzbekistan	7
Afghan expatriates	2	Netherlands	6
Afghan religious leaders	2	Switzerland	5
International Union of Muslim Scholars (IAMS)	2	Turkmenistan	5
Nordic Women Mediators Network (NWM)	2	Australia	4
United Voice of Afghan Women for Peace Policy	2	Canada	4
Afghan Civil Society Forum-organization (ACSFo)	1	Ambassadors of troop-contributing countries	2
Afghan university students	1	Czech Republic	2
Afghan war victims	1	Estonia	2
Afghan Women's Network	1	Kuwait	2
Afghanistan Cricket Board	1	Sweden	2
Business Council for International Understanding (BCIU)	1	Finland	1
Center for Civilians in Conflict	1	Iraq	1
Committee for the Advocacy of Ethnic and Religious Minorities	1	Kazakhstan	1
Dunya University of Afghanistan	1	South Korea	1
Heart of Asia Society	1	Spain	1
Institute of War and Peace Studies (IWPS)	1		
International peace experts and diplomats	1		
Jinnah Institute	1		
Mediothek Youth Network	1		
Pakistan Center for Research & Security Studies	1		
Sayed Akbar Agha	1		
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan	1		
Women's Initiative for Peace and Security	1		
Youth Contact Group for Peace	1		

Appendix
B

Network Comparison of Four Phases of Negotiations

(Actors in the upper 50th percentile of meeting activity are labeled.)

Actor Type


■ Afghan Government

■ Civil Society


■ Taliban

■ IGOs/Country Representatives


Period 1




Period 2



Period 3



Period 4




Appendix
D

Disaggregated Network of Afghan Peace Process Actors

(All actors are shown.)

Actor Type

- Afghan Government
- Civil Society
- Taliban
- IGOs/Country Representatives



ACTOR	MEETING DYADS	CENTRALITY-DEGREE	CENTRALITY-EIGEN	CENTRALITY-CLOSENESS	CENTRALITY-BETWEENNESS	CLUSTER-FAST GREEDY	CLUSTER-LEADINGEIGEN	CLUSTER-MULTILEVEL	CLUSTER-SPINGLASS
Afghan Civil Society Forum-organization (ACSFo)	1	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	2	1	3	2
Afghan civil society representatives	3	2	0.128	0.006	5.078	2	1	3	2
Afghan expatriates	2	1	0.055	0.005	0.000	2	1	3	2
Afghan Government	373	48	1.000	0.009	1146.998	1	2	1	3
Afghan Government Negotiation Team	124	39	0.810	0.008	880.593	2	1	3	2
Afghan journalists	6	4	0.220	0.007	8.083	1	3	1	3
Afghan province representatives	13	3	0.162	0.006	8.083	2	1	3	2
Afghan religious leaders	2	2	0.134	0.006	0.000	1	2	1	3
Afghan university students	1	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	2	1	3	2
Afghan war victims	1	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	2	1	3	2
Afghan women civil society leaders	8	5	0.299	0.007	5.078	3	1	4	2
Afghan Women's Network	1	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
Afghan youth	7	3	0.185	0.006	5.078	1	2	1	3
Afghanistan Cricket Board	1	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	2	1	3	2
Aga Khan Development Network	5	4	0.177	0.006	1.383	3	3	4	1
AIHRC	31	18	0.491	0.007	224.688	3	3	4	1
Ambassadors of troop-contributing countries	2	2	0.125	0.006	0.000	2	1	3	2

ACTOR	MEETING DYADS	CENTRALITY-DEGREE	CENTRALITY-EIGEN	CENTRALITY-CLOSENESS	CENTRALITY-BETWEENNESS	CLUSTER-FAST GREEDY	CLUSTER-LEADINGEIGEN	CLUSTER-MULTILEVEL	CLUSTER-SPINGLASS
American University of Afghanistan	4	4	0.228	0.006	0.000	3	1	4	2
Australia	4	1	0.071	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
BCIU	1	1	0.063	0.005	0.000	1	1	1	3
Canada	4	2	0.105	0.005	0.000	1	3	1	3
Center for Civilians in Conflict	1	1	0.035	0.005	0.000	3	1	4	1
China	28	9	0.419	0.007	5.453	4	1	3	2
Committee for the Advocacy of Ethnic and Religious Minorities	1	1	0.035	0.005	0.000	3	1	4	1
Czech Republic	2	1	0.071	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
Denmark	10	5	0.222	0.006	31.280	3	3	4	1
Dunya University of Afghanistan	1	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	2	1	3	2
Estonia	2	1	0.071	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
EU	37	13	0.603	0.007	17.726	1	4	2	4
Finland	1	1	0.071	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
France	18	10	0.470	0.006	0.425	2	4	2	4
Friends of Afghan Women	3	2	0.107	0.005	0.000	3	1	4	2
Germany	33	12	0.556	0.007	17.133	2	1	2	4
Heart of Asia Istanbul Process	2	2	0.107	0.005	0.000	3	3	4	2
Heart of Asia Society	1	1	0.071	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
IAMS	2	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	2	1	3	2
ICRC	6	4	0.205	0.006	0.000	2	1	3	2
India	21	8	0.369	0.007	5.078	1	2	1	3

ACTOR	MEETING DYADS	CENTRALITY-DEGREE	CENTRALITY-EIGEN	CENTRALITY-CLOSENESS	CENTRALITY-BETWEENNESS	CLUSTER-FAST GREEDY	CLUSTER-LEADINGEIGEN	CLUSTER-MULTILEVEL	CLUSTER-SPINGLASS
Indonesia	7	4	0.246	0.006	5.078	2	1	3	2
Institute of War and Peace Studies (IWPS)	1	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
International peace experts and diplomats	1	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	2	1	3	2
Iran	21	9	0.419	0.007	5.453	4	5	3	2
Iraq	1	1	0.063	0.005	0.000	1	1	1	3
Italy	15	10	0.494	0.007	8.037	2	2	2	4
Japan	8	3	0.185	0.006	5.078	1	2	1	3
Jinnah Institute	1	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
Kazakhstan	1	1	0.071	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
Kuwait	2	2	0.128	0.006	5.078	2	1	3	2
Mediothek Youth Network	1	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	2	1	3	2
National Youth Consensus for Peace	14	10	0.447	0.006	5.037	2	4	2	4
NATO	178	29	0.810	0.008	506.889	1	2	1	3
Netherlands	6	3	0.163	0.006	0.000	3	3	4	1
Nordic Women Mediators Network (NWM)	2	2	0.073	0.005	0.000	3	1	4	1
Norway	27	11	0.524	0.007	10.348	2	1	2	4
OIC	1	1	0.071	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
Pakistan	35	12	0.542	0.007	19.163	4	5	3	2
Pakistan Center for Research & Security Studies	1	1	0.071	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
Qatar	37	9	0.426	0.007	18.949	1	1	1	3
Russia	16	9	0.419	0.007	5.453	4	1	3	2

ACTOR	MEETING DYADS	CENTRALITY-DEGREE	CENTRALITY-EIGEN	CENTRALITY-CLOSENESS	CENTRALITY-BETWEENNESS	CLUSTER-FAST GREEDY	CLUSTER-LEADINGEIGEN	CLUSTER-MULTILEVEL	CLUSTER-SPINGLASS
Sayed Akbar Agha	1	1	0.055	0.005	0.000	2	1	3	2
Shanghai Cooperation Organization	1	1	0.071	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
South Korea	1	1	0.071	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
Spain	1	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
Sweden	2	2	0.092	0.006	3.005	3	1	4	1
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan	1	1	0.071	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
Switzerland	5	5	0.204	0.006	3.139	3	1	4	1
Tajikistan	8	2	0.134	0.006	0.000	1	2	1	3
Taliban Negotiation Team	112	24	0.773	0.008	247.554	2	1	3	2
Turkey	17	6	0.329	0.007	5.078	1	2	1	3
Turkmenistan	5	3	0.182	0.006	5.078	2	1	3	2
UK	29	12	0.553	0.007	2.019	2	4	2	4
UN	79	20	0.710	0.008	109.915	3	3	4	2
United Voice of Afghan Women for Peace Policy	2	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	2	1	3	2
US	160	30	0.899	0.008	390.493	1	2	1	3
Uzbekistan	7	2	0.134	0.006	0.000	1	2	1	3
Women's Initiative for Peace and Security	1	1	0.057	0.005	0.000	1	2	1	3
Youth Contact Group for Peace	1	1	0.063	0.005	0.000	1	1	1	3

Appendix
F01

Correlation Matrix Comparing Clustering Algorithms

	FAST GREEDY	LEADINGEIGEN	MULTILEVEL	SPINGLASS
FAST GREEDY	▶ 1			
LEADINGEIGEN	▶ 0.54	1		
MULTILEVEL	▶ 0.65	▶ 0.7	1	
SPINGLASS	▶ 0.58	▶ 0.69	▶ 0.97	1

Appendix
F02

Correlation Matrix of Different Centrality Measures

	CENTRALITY EIGEN	CENTRALITY CLOSENESS	CENTRALITY BETWEENNESS
CENTRALITY EIGEN	▶ 1		
CENTRALITY CLOSENESS	▶ 0.54	1	
CENTRALITY BETWEENNESS	▶ 0.65	▶ 0.7	1

Related Publications

1. Joshi, Madhav and David Cortright. 2021. "To end war in Afghanistan, Taliban demand Afghan president's removal." *The Conversation*. 11 August.
2. Joshi, Madhav. 2021. *Assessing Implementation of the 2020 US-Taliban Peace Accord*. Notre Dame, IN: Keough School of Global Affairs (Report).
3. Joshi, Madhav and Louise Olsson. 2021. "What's at Stake for Women in Afghanistan." *Political Violence at a Glance*, 14 April.
4. Cortright, David and Madhav Joshi. 2021. "Securing a Plan for Ending the War in Afghanistan." *IPI Global Observatory*, 16 March.
5. Joshi, Madhav and Louise Olsson. 2021. "A Critical Moment for Women's Political Rights in Intra-Afghan Negotiation and Beyond." *PRIO Blog*. 3 March.
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9. Hauenstein, Matthew and Madhav Joshi. 2019. "Framework Deal: A Long-Term Path to Peace in Afghanistan." *Political Violence at a Glance*, 13 February.

The Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) is a research initiative of the University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. PAM contributes to implementation verification, monitoring, and research by providing a unique source of comparable data on peace agreements, and, through its website, allows scholars and practitioners to compare 51 different themes in all the comprehensive peace agreements signed since 1989. The project also produces numerous policy briefs and academic publications to advance peace agreement negotiation and implementation.

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